librium theories, usually associated with the fix-price approach. 2 For Negishi, economic agents base decisions on perceived demand (or supply) curves which are purely "subjective" except at equilibrium; in contrast our conjectured demand curves are, in Nikaido's (1975) terminology, "objective". 3 We start by defining a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a single sector (viewed as a "representativie industry") and at a money wage taken as given by all agents. If one follows temporary general equilibrium theory (see Grandmont (1977) ) with its particular view of money, and admits the possibility of quantity rationing in the labour market, one can view this as a "short-run" equilibrium and suppose that the wage is chosen at some preliminary stage. The model also has a "static" interpretation, where money is a nonproduced good and the nominal wage is a parameter which is competitively adjusted. In the following we shall always maintain the two interpretations.
This paper aims to give sufficient conditions first for the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in an objective demand framework and then for the existence of unemployment at any positive wage level (what we call "involuntary unemployment"). The idea can be described simply for a single produced good. In the labour market we assume an inelastic labour supply at any positive wage level. First we construct an oligopoly model which allows for the labour supply constraint and the indirect effects of producers' decisions on the demand they face. Sufficient conditions are given for the existence of such an extended Cournot equilibrium at any given money wage. Then we want to show that, at all positive wage levels, equilibrium entails unemployment. For that, allowing some wealth to be in the form of money and assuming that the elasticity of demand is low for small prices, we find that the prices associated with the Cournot equilibrium do not tend to zero even when the money wage tends to zero (just as in Cournot's own model with zero marginal costs). Demand is positive if the money stock is. But if money is low enough, the equilibrium price level and elasticity of demand are then small enough to equate the marginal revenue product of labour with the money wage (possibly zero) at some small equilibrium level of employment. This could not happen under perfect competition. As the money wage tends to zero, competitive prices vanish and full employment is reached unless demand is saturated or productive employment is bounded.
Our definition of involuntary unemployment is stronger than the usual one: "at the prevailing real wages, workers unsuccessfully seek jobs for which they are just as qualified as the current job holders" (type 1 involuntary unemployment, Lindbeck and Snower (1985) ). We require unemployed workers willing to work not only at the prevailing wage (whatever this may be) but at any positive money wage that could have been preliminary fixed. This, we feel, is closer to Keynes' idea that unemployment is involuntary when there is "no method available to labour as a whole" for attaining full employment "by making revised money bargains with the entrepreneurs" (Keynes (1936) , p. 13).
This definition also differs from the idea that involuntary unemployment occurs, when "workers unsuccessfully seek work at real wages which fall short of their potential contribution to society" (type 2 involuntary unemployment, Lindbeck and Snower (1985) ). This is really a notion of "underemployment", in the sense either that there are multiple oligopolistic equilibria, with more or less employment, that may be Pareto-ranked (see e.g. Heller (1986) or Roberts (1986)), or that the level of employment is less at the oligopolistic equilibrium than at the competitive equilibrium (see e.g. Hart 1982)). All markets, including labour, clear. Yet the distinction between these notions of underemployment and our concept is less important than might appear. In the static interpretation of our model we recover market-clearing with perfectly flexible wages (either by allowing a zero wage or by having a supply of labour that is not perfectly inelastic), and then our involuntary unemployment result can be reinterpreted accordingly as an underemployment result of one of the above types. Our Cournot-Nash equilibrium, with full-employment at a zero wage, is compatible with a competitive equilibrium with full employment at a positive wage, and the different oligopolistic equilibria obtained by varying the wage level could be Pareto-ranked. The essence of our unemployment result is this: despite assuming neither demand saturation nor bounded productive employment, and allowing for correctly perceived feedback effects, the total labour demand correspondence, generated by computing the different Cournot-Nash equilibria corresponding to different wage levels, is bounded. We therefore leave our model open. We do not need to specify how the wage level is fixed. We think that a plausible way to close the model is to introduce a first stage at which the wage is decided either by the firms (as in Roberts (1986) ), or by the workers through their unions (as in Hart (1982) or Silvestre (1988) ), or even by both through some sort of bargaining process (as in Dixon (1987) ). According to the static interpretation, the model can also be closed by varying the wage level parametrically down to zero, the labour market clearing level. Involuntary unemployment is thus tantamount to a general equilibrium with a zero wage in an economy where product markets are oligopolistic but the labour market is competitive. Such a phenomenon appears in the Keynesian model with monopolistic competition of Grandmont and Laroque (1976) , where it depends upon arbitrary pessimistic expectations of firms.
The problem with describing demand curves faced by producers as "objective" is essentially related to the income variable appearing in the demand function. It creates a particular kind of multiplier effect. That this effect may be allowed for by producers themselves was clear in the mind of Henry Ford:
"I believe in the first place that, all other considerations aside, our own sales depend in a measure upon the wages we pay. If we can distribute high wages, then that money is going to be spent and it will serve to make storekeepers and distributors and manufacturers and workers in other lines more prosperous and their prosperity will be reflected in our sales. Country-wide hide wages spell country-wide prosperity, provided, however, the higher wages are paid for higher production." [(1922) , p. 124]
The "Ford effect" complicates the definition of an oligopolistic equilibrium. One tack is to make producers take the total wage income plus the total distributed profits as given. This parameter is adjusted at equilibrium. That is the approach of Marschak and Selten (1974) and more recently Hart (1982 Hart ( , 1985 who calls it the "no feedback effects" assumption. 4 We make a different assumption -more plausible if firms are seen as knowing the "true" demand function -and make producers take all feedback effects into account. Alternatively one could model producers as only recognizing feedback effects going through total wage income. This may seem natural since, on the one hand, for any producer, the wage as well as the employment levels of the other producers are supposed to be known by him when fixing his own employment level and since, on the other hand, the consumers know precisely whether they are employed when they decide on their consumption. But one would then retain the Marschak and Selten (1974) assumption on distributed profits: they are treated parametrically and adjusted at equilibrium. Such an intermediate approach found in d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard- Varet (1989) complicates the proofs. The present paper will include the feedback effects due to distributed profits.
In this framework we establish existence of an oligopolistic equilibrium under assumptions that include convexity of producers' technologies and homotheticity of (identical) consumers' preferences. This keeps the model closer to the usual partial equilibrium Cournot modelbut does not require identical firms (as in Hart (1982) , Heller (1986) 5 ) nor, as often assumed, demand saturation at a nil price (see e.g. Novshek (1985) ). This last assumption would render an "involuntary unemployment" result trivial.
The paper is organized thus. Section 2 introduces the model, defines an extended CournotNash equilibrium, and presents assumptions ensuring existence. Section 3 defines involuntary unemployment and analyses its possibility. We conclude in Section 4.
An extended Cournot-Nash equilibrium
We analyse an economy with an oligopolistic market for a homogeneous product and a labour market. There is also a nonproduced good, money.
A finite set N = {1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , n} of firms produces the homogeneous produced good. Each firm in this set is characterized by a real cost function i which, for every level y i of output, indicates the minimal amount of labour z i = i (y i ) required. We assume that competition between these firms is oligopolistic "à la Cournot" and that they have a complete knowledge of the demand behaviour of the consumers. Y and Z denote total production and total employment.
The set of consumers coincides with the set of potential workers and is represented by an interval [0, L]. For simplicity, each individual supplies one unit of labour whatever the nonnegative money wage w. Hence L is the total inelastic supply of labour. Our main restriction concerns the demand for the produced good. We assume that the consumers differ only in income and wealth; all have the same homothetic preferences. This implies that aggregate demand is multiplicatively separable and can be written for a price p > 0 of the produced good, as
where (pY − wZ) denotes aggregate profits, wZ the total wage income and M > 0 the total monetary wealth in the economy -which is the total initial endowment of the non produced good for the static interpretation, and includes past savings as well as the present value of expected future income for the temporary equilibrium interpretation. This will keep us close to the usual partial equilibrium Cournot model. Moreover, assuming along this line that the producers serve
The next two assumptions ensure existence of a differentiable inverse demand function. The first is rather standard:
[1] The function h, defined and continuous for all positive prices, is non-negative and, whenever positive, twice continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing. Also,
The second restricts the marginal propensity to consume ph(p). It states (as in Hart (1982) ) that the desired ratio of the two goods,
is nonnegative, finite and decreasing in p whenever positive. More conveniently:
[2] For all p > 0 and whenever h(p) > 0, ph(p) < min{1, η(p)}, where
denotes the (Marshallian) price elasticity of the demand function. The elasticity of substitution between the two goods
is simply assumed to be positive and finite for any positive desired ratio of the two goods.
Letting m = M/L be the per capita monetary wealth, we may define an "inverse demand
and [2] , ψ exists and is equal to
For any firm i ∈ N , the profit associated with any chosen level of production y i ≥ 0, given the choices of the other firms, say
+ , is the function parameterized in w ≥ 0, m > 0 and L > 0:
For given values of the parameters w, m and L we get a standard Cournot oligopoly model based on an "objective" inverse demand function, incorporating all feedback effects, except that we now also need to consider the constraint from the explicit representation of the labour market, that is, the choice of the y i 's is restricted by the condition
An extended Cournot-Nash equilibrium for given possible values of the parameters w, m and L is a vector y * ∈ IR n + such that, for all i ∈ N , y * i is a solution of the program:
For any possible values of the parameters w, m and L we denote by Y(w, m, L) ⊂ IR n + the set of extended Cournot-Nash equilibria.
The next set of assumptions ensures the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for any value of the parameters w, m and L:
[4] For all p > 0 and whenever
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, as defined above. than what we have here on the demand side. However, by his Theorem 4, we know that our assumptions on demand are too weak to get existence while keeping his minimal assumptions on the production side. We must assume convex cost functions ore, more precisely: Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (1989), where condition [4] is imposed on η, not on σ. As it stands, [4] implies that η p/η is larger than −|1 − η| if η ≥ 1, but larger than −|1 − η|
Given these assumptions, we can use Debreu (1952) "Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem" to obtain Y(w, m, L) = ∅ for all values of the parameters w ≥ 0, m > 0 and L > 0. Indeed by [5] , for each i ∈ N , the correspondence
to IR + , restricting the admissible strategies, is continuous, has a nonempty compact graph and is convex-valued, so that the function
is continuous in y −i . The function i is convex. Using [4] we then find that the profit function Π i is strictly quasi-concave in y i : it is enough to check that, whenever
Moreover,
as lim We remark in addition that for n = 1, the equilibrium is simply the monopoly solution, which is unique. 
Existence of involuntary unemployment
, full employment will always be achieved. For such a sequence in the next theorem we distinguish two cases. In the first case we suppose that lim s→∞ w s > 0 and we will be led to a contradiction by the assumptions we have already made. In the second case we suppose that lim s→∞ w s = 0 and we will need the additional assumption:
implying some complementarity between the two goods for large desired ratios of the produced to the non-produced good (and the more so, the larger the number of firms, i.e. the larger the degree of competition in the output market).
Our main result is then: If, in addition, Assumption [6] holds, then the same inequality holds true for w = 0, i.e. there is involuntary unemployment.
The proof is given in appendix. But we can make the following observation. Consider the equilibrium total production:
As m s goes to zero, Y s must remain large enough so that How restrictive is Assumption [6] ? It becomes more restrictive as the number of firms increases. At the limit, when the economy is perfectly competitive, it cannot be fulfilled since σ(p) = 0 implies η(p) = ph(p) in contradiction with [2] . In this limit case, involuntary unemployment is still possible, but it requires demand saturation in the output market. Indeed, if this market is perfectly competitive and unemployment persists as w tends to zero, we get, by first order conditions for profit maximization, for all i ∈ N ,
By the same argument p tends to zero if Y tends to infinity. If Y remains finite, then by [5] i (y i ) < ∞ and the competitive price p must go to zero as w tends to zero. So, by involuntary unemployment lim where a similar inequality is imposed on η, the elasticity of h, not on σ, the elasticity of H.
whereas the converse is not true. As ph < η, again by [2] , the condition lim
ph(p) < 1/n, so that the marginal propensity to consume must become very small for prices close to zero when n is large, if this condition is to be satisfied. This does not result from [6] . A profit income feedback effect, leading to a lower price elasticity of the relevant demand function (when demand is inelastic), makes involuntary unemployment more likely.
To shed more light here, we shall present utility functions satisfying assumptions [1] to [4] and [6] . We deal successively with the two basic interpretations of the model we gave at the start, the temporary equilibrium one and the static one.
First consider the static interpretation. Assumptions [1] and [2] are satisfied if all consumers have identical smooth, convex, homothetic preferences (defined on the nonnegative orthant), such that the indifference curves do not cut the produced good axis and that the marginal rate of substitution is strictly decreasing (whenever both goods are desired). Assumptions [3] , [4] and [6] impose additional restrictions on the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. A sufficient condition for these restrictions to be met is that the elasticity of substitution decreases from a value larger than one to a value less than 1/n when the ratio of the produced to the nonproduced good increases from zero to infinity. This excludes C.E.S. utility functions, though a constant elasticity of substitution larger than one leads to a demand function satisfying
An example of utility function satisfying this sufficient condition on the elasticity of substitution and, more generally, leading to a demand function fulfilling all the assumptions [1] to [4] and [6] is:
where c andm denote the consumed quantities of the produced and nonproduced goods, respectively. Denoting by R(k), k = c/m, the marginal rate of substitution, we find:
As R (k) = e k − 1 > 0 (entailing [2] ) and given the first-order condition for an interior optimum, R(k) = 1/p, there is a reservation price equal to one (entailing [3] ), and the elasticity of substitution increases in p (fulfilling [4] ) and tends to zero when p tends to zero (fulfilling [6] ).
[1] is also clearly satisfied. From the first-order condition, the inverse demand function is:
H −1 (k) remains positive for all k: demand is not saturated when the price is zero.
Lastly, the temporary equilibrium interpretation of the model. Now the consumer maximizes an intertemporal utility function, and the nonproduced good has an indirect utility derived from its monetary function as a store of value. Under constant expectations about future prices, similar assumptions about elasticity of substitution between present and future consumption will again lead to the fulfillment of [1] to [4] and [6] . But if future prices depend upon the present output price, we must introduce a suitable combination of two kinds of elasticities, for intertemporal substitution and expectations.
To make things simple, consider a two-period planning horizon and a C.E.S. intertemporal utility function:
, where δ > 0, γ > 0 and γ = 1, and where c t is the tth period consumption. Maximization of U under a single intertemporal budget constraint yields:
where W is the present value of consumer wealth. Assuming that the future expected price is a positive nondecreasing function of the (positive) present price: p 2 = P (p 1 ), and omitting the subscript for the first period, we have:
where
is the elasticity of expectations and γ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Here assumptions [1] to [4] and [6] are satisfied if:
In the static case, assumption [6] , leading to involuntary unemployment, required some complementarity between the two goods. In the present temporary equilibrium context, the same assumption is compatible with an elasticity of substitution between present and future consumption larger than one, provided expectations of the future output price are elastic enough.
A fall in the current price could even lower current demand if it led to a disproportionately large fall in expected future prices, and intertemporal substitution were sufficiently strong, a case that we have excluded to avoid demand saturation. Assumption [6] becomes increasingly difficult to satisfy, as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the number of firms increase. As a last remark, we observe that in case (i), and as long as lim p→0 ε(p) < γ/(γ − 1), and in case (ii), assumption [6] is compatible in our example with the absence of demand saturation at a nil price. 10 10 Indeed, by the restrictions imposed on ε, entailing that H is decreasing, p γ P (p) 1−γ is increasing in p, and it is easy to show that it tends to zero with p. Suppose that it does not. Then P (p) γ−1 tends to zero and, by l'Hospital's rule, lim
Conclusion
This paper has studied the possibility of a type of unemployment which is not associated with a misperception of the producers' environment and which appears at any positive wage. Leaving aside the trivial cases where there is a capacity ceiling to productive employment and where consumers' current needs can be satiated, we have seen that such a type of unemployment is likelier the weaker the degree of competition. Under the same assumptions, a perfectly competitive general equilibrium exists at a non zero wage.
As a first step in this investigation, we proposed an extension of Cournot equilibrium, allowing for the interaction between the product and the labour markets, at a given money wage.
Adopting an objective viewpoint, producers were assumed here to be able to conjecture the "true" demand functions they face. We have formulated conditions sufficient for the existence of the defined equilibrium, implying neither concave profit functions nor identical firms but including convex technologies. The analysis was simplified by assuming a particular type of homothetic preference.
The next step showed that unemployment emerges at any money wage for a sufficiently low value of the individual wealth, with an additional assumption of a low enough elasticity of substitution at prices close to zero (Assumption [6] ). This is weaker than assuming demand saturation at a nil price, but becomes more and more stringent as the number of firms increases (i.e. as competition becomes less imperfect). In the limit case of perfect competition, only demand saturation can lead to unemployment when the money wage can be chosen arbitrarily small.
When unemployment arises whatever the money wage level, there is genuine "involuntary" unemployment, in Keynes' sense that no expedient exists by which labour as a whole can achieve full employment "by making revised money bargains with the entrepreneurs". Under the tem- we get a contradiction. in contradiction with [6] . The result follows.
